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Handbook on Approval Voting (Record no. 25568)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 03738nam a22004695i 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20140310152708.0
007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field cr nn 008mamaa
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 100628s2010 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9783642028397
978-3-642-02839-7
050 #4 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB1-846.8
082 04 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 330.1
Edition number 23
264 #1 -
-- Berlin, Heidelberg :
-- Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
-- 2010.
912 ## -
-- ZDB-2-SBE
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Laslier, Jean-François.
Relator term editor.
245 10 - IMMEDIATE SOURCE OF ACQUISITION NOTE
Title Handbook on Approval Voting
Medium [electronic resource] /
Statement of responsibility, etc edited by Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver.
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent XVIII, 480p. 49 illus.
Other physical details online resource.
440 1# - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE
Title Studies in Choice and Welfare,
International Standard Serial Number 1614-0311
505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note to the Handbook on Approval Voting -- History of Approval Voting -- Acclamation Voting in Sparta: An Early Use of Approval Voting -- Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting -- Axiomatic Theory -- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences -- Axiomatizations of Approval Voting -- Committees -- Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections -- Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will? -- Strategic Voting -- The Basic Approval Voting Game -- Approval Voting in Large Electorates -- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting -- Probabilistic Exercises -- On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives -- Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting -- In Silico Voting Experiments -- Experiments -- Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting -- Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections -- Approval Voting in Germany: Description of a Field Experiment -- Electoral Competition -- Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting -- Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections -- Meaning for Individual and Society -- Describing Society Through Approval Data -- Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc Under Approval Voting, voters can ''approve" as many candidates as they want, and the candidate approved by the largest number of voters is elected. Since the publication of the seminal book written by Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn in 1983, a variety of theoretical and empirical works have enhanced our understanding of this method. The behavior of voters in such elections has been observed both in the laboratory and in the field; social choice theorists have analyzed the method from the axiomatic point of view; game theory and computer science have been used to scrutinize various strategic aspects; and political scientists have considered the structure of electoral competition entailed by Approval Voting. This book surveys this large body of knowledge through a collection of contributions written by specialists of the various disciplines involved.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Economics.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Mathematics.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Finance.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Political science.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Economics/Management Science.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Economic Theory.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Public Finance & Economics.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Political Science.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Sanver, M. Remzi.
Relator term editor.
710 2# - ADDED ENTRY--CORPORATE NAME
Corporate name or jurisdiction name as entry element SpringerLink (Online service)
773 0# - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Springer eBooks
776 08 - ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL FORM ENTRY
Display text Printed edition:
International Standard Book Number 9783642028380
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme
Item type E-Book
Copies
Price effective from Permanent location Date last seen Not for loan Date acquired Source of classification or shelving scheme Koha item type Damaged status Lost status Withdrawn status Current location Full call number
2014-04-14AUM Main Library2014-04-14 2014-04-14 E-Book   AUM Main Library330.1