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Collective Decision Making (Record no. 25569)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 03800nam a22004215i 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20140310152708.0
007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field cr nn 008mamaa
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 100623s2010 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9783642028656
978-3-642-02865-6
050 #4 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB1-846.8
082 04 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 330.1
Edition number 23
264 #1 -
-- Berlin, Heidelberg :
-- Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
-- 2010.
912 ## -
-- ZDB-2-SBE
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Van Deemen, Adrian.
Relator term editor.
245 10 - IMMEDIATE SOURCE OF ACQUISITION NOTE
Title Collective Decision Making
Medium [electronic resource] :
Remainder of title Views from Social Choice and Game Theory /
Statement of responsibility, etc edited by Adrian Van Deemen, Agnieszka Rusinowska.
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent XIV, 266 p.
Other physical details online resource.
440 1# - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE
Title Theory and Decision Library C, Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research,
International Standard Serial Number 0924-6126 ;
Volume number/sequential designation 43
505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note From Black’s Advice and Arrow’s Theorem to the Gibbard–Satterthewaite Result -- The Impact of Forcing Preference Rankings When Indifference Exists -- Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models -- Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules -- Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making -- Rights Revisited, and Limited -- Some General Results on Responsibility for Outcomes -- Existence of a Dictatorial Subgroup in Social Choice with Independent Subgroup Utility Scales, an Alternative Proof -- Making (Non-standard) Choices -- Puzzles and Paradoxes Involving Averages: An Intuitive Approach -- Voting Weights, Thresholds and Population Size: Member State Representation in the Council of the European Union -- Stabilizing Power Sharing -- Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games -- Networks, Information and Choice -- Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions by Properties of Their Status Quo Sets -- Monotonicity Properties of Interval Solutions and the Dutta–Ray Solution for Convex Interval Games.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc This book discusses collective decision making from the perspective of social choice and game theory. The chapters are written by well-known scholars in the field. The topics range from Arrow’s Theorem to the Condorcet and Ostrogorski Paradoxes, from vote distributions in the European Council to influence processes and information sharing in collective decision making networks; from cardinal utility to restricted domains for social welfare functions; from rights and game forms to responsibility in committee decision making; and from dueling to bargaining. The book reflects the richness and diversity of the field of collective decision making and shows the usefulness and adequacy of social choice and game theory for the study of it. It starts with typical social choice themes like Arrow’s Theorem and ends with typical game theoretical topics, like bargaining and interval games. In between there is a mixture of views on collective decision making in which both social choice and game theoretic aspects are brought in. The book is dedicated to Harrie de Swart, who organized the well-known Social Choice Colloquia at the University of Tilburg in the Netherlands.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Economics.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Finance.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Economics/Management Science.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Economic Theory.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Public Finance & Economics.
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Rusinowska, Agnieszka.
Relator term editor.
710 2# - ADDED ENTRY--CORPORATE NAME
Corporate name or jurisdiction name as entry element SpringerLink (Online service)
773 0# - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Springer eBooks
776 08 - ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL FORM ENTRY
Display text Printed edition:
International Standard Book Number 9783642028649
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme
Item type E-Book
Copies
Price effective from Permanent location Date last seen Not for loan Date acquired Source of classification or shelving scheme Koha item type Damaged status Lost status Withdrawn status Current location Full call number
2014-04-14AUM Main Library2014-04-14 2014-04-14 E-Book   AUM Main Library330.1
Languages: 
English |
العربية