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Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets (Record no. 25733)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02805nam a22005175i 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20140310152711.0
007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field cr nn 008mamaa
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 110629s2011 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9783642197635
978-3-642-19763-5
050 #4 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB144
082 04 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 330.0151
Edition number 23
Classification number 330
Edition number 23
264 #1 -
-- Berlin, Heidelberg :
-- Springer Berlin Heidelberg :
-- Imprint: Springer,
-- 2011.
912 ## -
-- ZDB-2-SBE
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Horniacek, Milan.
Relator term author.
245 10 - IMMEDIATE SOURCE OF ACQUISITION NOTE
Title Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets
Medium [electronic resource] /
Statement of responsibility, etc by Milan Horniacek.
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent VII, 92p.
Other physical details online resource.
440 1# - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE
Title Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,
International Standard Serial Number 0075-8442 ;
Volume number/sequential designation 649
505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note Introduction -- Model -- Existence of an SRPE and an SSPE -- Efficiency of an SRPE and an SSPE -- Afterword.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we apply. It requires that no coalition of players in no subgame can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation average discounted payoffs of its members by a deviation. If the sum of firms' average discounted profits is maximized along the equilibrium path then the equilibrium output of each type of good is produced with the lowest possible costs. If, in addition, all buyers are retailers (i.e., they resell the goods purchased in the analyzed market in a retail market) then the equilibrium vector of the quantities sold in the retail market is sold with the lowest possible selling costs. We specify sufficient conditions under which collusion increases consumer welfare.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Economics.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Mathematics.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Economic policy.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Industrial organization (Economic theory).
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Microeconomics.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Economics, Mathematical.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Economics/Management Science.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Game Theory/Mathematical Methods.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Industrial Organization.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Economic Policy.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Economic Theory.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Microeconomics.
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
710 2# - ADDED ENTRY--CORPORATE NAME
Corporate name or jurisdiction name as entry element SpringerLink (Online service)
773 0# - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Springer eBooks
776 08 - ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL FORM ENTRY
Display text Printed edition:
International Standard Book Number 9783642197628
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19763-5
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme
Item type E-Book
Copies
Price effective from Permanent location Date last seen Not for loan Date acquired Source of classification or shelving scheme Koha item type Damaged status Lost status Withdrawn status Current location Full call number
2014-04-16AUM Main Library2014-04-16 2014-04-16 E-Book   AUM Main Library330.0151

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