Introduction and Theory -- Introduction and research problem -- A theoretical framework -- The institutional structure of transatlantic regulatory cooperation -- Case Studies -- Waste Electrical and Electronical Equipment -- Ozone-depleting substance -- Animal testing for cosmetic procucts -- Metric labeling.- Summary and Conclusions -- The four cases and their outcome -- Generalizing the conclusions to other cases.

Oliver Ziegler raises the question of what role economic interests of the United States play in the regulatory decision making process of the European Union. Critics often assume that U. S. dominance in the world economy, fueled by a powerful business elite, has significantly affected EU regulations at the expense of environmental and consumer protection standards. The author falsifies this proposition. He shows, first, that the EU often adopts regulations against the explicit opposition of the U. S. thereby ignoring the principles of transatlantic regulatory cooperation. Second, he demonstrates that business interests in the EU are usually not homogenous and often come second to environmental and consumer concerns. In addition, the author shows the increasing role of the European Parliament in EU regulatory decison making.